Safety Alerts & News:


SAFETY ALERTS  

 

Safety Alert - Shotgun Sticks - Product #4008

Stop Use and Replace Notice

Immediate Attention Required

January 15, 2007

Dear Amprobe Customer:


In cooperation with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Amprobe is voluntarily recalling the ACD-10 PRO, ACD-10 TRMS-PRO, ACD-14 and ACD-14 TRMS Digital Clamp Meters. Please stop using all of these products and return your unit to Amprobe and your unit will be replaced with an AC75B or ACD-15 TRMS PRO Digital Clamp Meter

Description of the Problem
The ACD-10 PRO, ACD-10 TRMS-PRO, ACD-14 and ACD-14 TRMS models "lock up" in certain circumstances failing to properly measure hazardous voltage levels on electrical systems. When the clamp meter locks up it provides readings under 1 volt or a millivolt reading. If the user does not follow industry standard practice by verifying the tester before and after checking a circuit, he/she may believe there is no voltage present when in fact there is. THIS COULD PLACE THE USER IN A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SITUATION.

Requested Actions
Stop using your ACD-10 PRO, ACD-10 TRMS-PRO, ACD-14 or ACD-14 TRMS Clamp Meter and contact Amprobe directly for a free replacement clamp meter. A postage-paid return mailer and a return tracking number can be requested through the worldwide web (use the Continue button below) -OR- by calling 1-800-350-8661 Monday through Friday between 7 a.m. and 4 p.m. Pacific Time.

As a replacement clamp, we offer either AC75B or ACD-15 TRMS-PRO. The features of the replacement clamps are provided in the table below.

 

To:                   Miller Fall Protection End-Users

From:               Miller Fall Protection

Date:                December 12, 2005

Subject:           Stop Use and Replace Notice

 


 

Please read, review and follow the instructions in this notice carefully.

 

In an on-going effort to ensure that Miller offers the safest fall protection products in the industry, we thoroughly investigated an issue reported by one of our customers involving the Miller MiniLite Fall Limiter (FL11).  Our findings reveal that during the period of August 2003 though August 2005 a manufacturing process was utilized that may have caused improper assembly of an internal component.  Originally it was believed this assembly procedure would not affect performance.  In August 2005, a new manufacturing process was started that was fully implemented by Sept 1, 2005.  Our recent investigation now shows that the assembly process used during August 2003 through August 2005 may result in the remote possibility of the unit functioning improperly in a fall.   Although we believe the possibility is remote, our customers? safety and confidence is our highest priority.  Given that, we have decided to replace all models listed below manufactured between August 2003 and August 2005. 

 

Products Included in this Notice:  

 

Miller MiniLite Fall Limiter

Titan Fall Limiter

Miller Custom Models

FL11 (All Models)

FL11CMK/

FL3M/11FT-AUS

TFL (All Models)

020095/11FT

020101/

030102/11FT

030281/13FT

040047/11FT

040184/

040201/11FT

050114/11FT

9038/

SRFS11-2/FTBL

 

Manufacture Dates:           August 2003 ? August 2005

 

This notice only affects the model numbers listed above and manufactured within the specified dates.  Miller and Titan models manufactured outside of these dates are not affected.  No other Miller self-retracting lifelines are affected.

 

Please take the following steps immediately:

1.       Remove from service all Miller MiniLite (FL11) and Titan Fall Limiter (TFL) models listed above and manufactured between August 2003 and August 2005.  The date of manufacture (mm/yy) and model number are located on the product label. (Refer to figure below)

2.       Text Box:  Contact the Miller Fall Protection Technical Service Department at 800-873-5242 to indicate that you have purchased these units.  An order for replacement units can be placed at that time with the Technical Service Representative.

 

You may select replacement units of the same configuration from any of the following:

1)       Miller MiniLite (FL11) or Titan (TFL)

2)      

 

 

Scorpion Personal Fall Limiter

3)       Miller 8327 or Titan TRW/8FT

 

  Two (2) Miller or Titan shock-absorbing web lanyards (single leg, 6 ft. length)

 (Refer to the Miller or Titan Product Catalogs for specific model descriptions.)

 

3.        To enter your replacement order, please provide the following:

                (A)  Model number, serial number, date of manufacture for each affected unit.  (Refer to figure above)

                (B)  Replacement product requested.

                (C)  Shipping instructions, i.e., company name, address, phone number, etc.

 

                                                                ** Continued on Reverse Side **

4.        We must confirm affected units are removed from service.  In order to do so, we request that you peel off the labels from the unit(s) being replaced, cut off the snap-hook and mail the labels to:

 

Miller Fall Protection

Engineering Technical Services Department

1345 15th Street

Franklin, PA 16323

 

We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.  We also want to assure you that Miller has a 60-year tradition of manufacturing high-quality fall protection products.  Our extensive line of Self Retracting Lifelines has a superior performance record and this Stop Use Order should not cause concern relative to our other products ? in fact, this action demonstrates our concern and that our customers? safety is our highest measure. 

 

     
 

EXPLOSION AT TRANSFORMER VAULT 

On April 6, 2005 the District received a customer call reporting a transformer explosion.  An investigation into the explosion determined the cause of the explosion was due to explosive gas produced overtime by a damaged secondary service in conduit.  Gases were produced when the damaged secondary generated heat and melted the insulation on the conductors, and the PVC conduit housing the service.  The gases continued to build until the cable faulted, and all the right conditions existed resulting in the explosion.  The explosion blew the doors open on the transformer, and metal covers off in the electrical room.  This again appears to be a very rare situation, only the second occurrence in the District's long history of operating our underground system.  After talking to cable testing laboratories the last time this occurred, and to B.C. Hydro whom in 1998 experienced a similar explosion on an underground conductor insulation and PVC conduit, if melted can produce gases that could cause an explosion.  More details and a report of the incident are available from the Safety Department. 

The purpose of this alert is to advise all affected employees of the potential hazard.  Employees should use caution when responding to underground problems by not smoking when approaching and opening equipment.  If the equipment is smoking or you smell smoke have the equipment de-energized at a different location.  Many gases can't be detected by sight or smell.  A gas detector can be used to try to determine if hazardous levels of gas are present, otherwise proceed with caution.

COURT UPHOLDS CITY OF SEATTLE

BAN ON POSTINGS ON UTILITY POLES

 

On September 9, 2004 the Washington State Supreme Court upheld the City of Seattle?s ban on attaching posters on City utility poles.

 

The case stemmed from the refusal of Mighty Movers, Inc. to pay for the cost of removing signs it had plastered on utility poles.  Mighty Movers then challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. The original trial court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance on the basis that the utility pole is a nonpublic forum and the ordinance is reasonable in light of the purposes of utility poles.  The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling by saying that utility poles are a traditional public forum and the ordinance is unconstitutional.    

 

The City of Seattle and IBEW Local 77 as, ?friend of the court? represented by the law firm of Rinehart & Robblee, appealed to the State Supreme Court.  By a 6 to 3 majority, the Court of Appeals decision was reversed. 

Aerial Lift Hydraulics Fire Hazard

A recent injury accident involving the use of an aerial lift bucket working in close proximity to

120/240 volt residential services has raised concerns about the adequacy of equipment design,

guarding, and safe operating procedures.

While in the process of moving an aerial lift bucket into position, an insulated secondary

service line became entangled between the outer edge of the bucket and the hydraulic tool

circuit manifold. The insulation on the service line was damaged, resulting in electrical arcing .

A hydraulic tool circuit fitting was burned through which allowed hydraulic fluid to escape

and become ignited by the arc. Fire immediately engulfed the bucket, resulting in second and

third degree burns to over 50 per cent of the operator?s body, plus lung damage due to smoke

inhalation.

 

To prevent recurrence of such an accident the following recommendations are offered:

  • With assistance and approval from the aerial lift manufacturer, evaluate all hydraulic fittings

                in close proximity to the bucket and eliminate any potential catch hazards.

    •  Whenever possible, and with the manufacturer?s approval, cover and appropriately insulate

                all fittings which present a hazard of catching a line.

    • Whenever operating an aerial lift in close proximity to potentially energized lines continually

                  check for proper positioning and possible contact with lines.

      • Evaluate the intended use of all aerial lift equipment and, when appropriate, use hydraulic

                    fluid with low ignition potential as recommended by the manufacturer.

        • Turn the tool circuit off while it is not in use. This will reduce the flow of hydraulic

                      fluid and lower the potential for ignition in the event of equipment failure or damage.

          •  Train all workers to be knowledgeable and competent in emergency response procedures

                        for shutting off the flow of hydraulic fluid.